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Review Essays 
UNORIGINALISM'S LAW WITHOUT 
MEANING 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN 
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION. By Jack N. 
Rakove. 1 New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1996. Pp. 439. 
Hardcover, $35.00. 
Saikrishna B. Prakash2 
It is curious and depressing that there continues to be a vig-
orous debate about how we ought to interpret the law. Interpre-
tation is so fundamental, yet there is no method that commands 
widespread acceptance. The proverbial honest Joe faces a pro-
found dilemma-how does he follow the law if he cannot grasp 
its meaning or predict what the prosecutor or the court will 
make of it? 
Originalism's advocates claim that it supplies the one, true 
interpretive method for honest Joe and for everybody else. As 
explained by Judge Robert H. Bork, originalism consists of dis-
cerning how a law "would have been understood at the time" it 
was enacted by uncovering its "public understanding," as "mani-
fested in the words used" in the text and in contemporaneous, 
secondary materials.3 
Professor Jack Rakove's book is, in part, one eminent histo-
rian's contribution to the debate about originalism. As a Stan-
ford University professor whose writings have centered on the 
1. Coe Professor of History and American Studies, Stanford University. 
2. Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to Jonathan 
Boonin, Nelson Lund, Michael S. Paulsen, Steven Smith, and John Yoo, for their excel· 
lent comments. 
3. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 
144 (The Free Press, 1990). 
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Constitution's ratification era, Rakove's opinions about the Con-
stitution's original meanings might be entitled to special defer-
ence. Indeed, Rakove and other historians could function as the 
~onstitution's high priests, deciphering its most cryptic provi-
siOns. 
Yet Rakove turns his back on originalism. According to 
Rakove, originalism relies on a history where definitive conclu-
sions are hard to reach and on a language that is ambiguous; it 
hinges on dubious notions of collective intent; it facilitates the 
judiciary's propensity for political judgments; it is undemocratic; 
it precludes revisions in light of our nation's experiences; and it 
holds evolved moral sensibilities hostage to ancient and incom-
plete meanings. 
This Review critiques Rakove's critique of originalism. 
When a reputed historian takes up cudgels against originalism, 
even die-hard originalists must pay heed. In some respects, 
Rakove is right on the money- originalist interpretation is no 
walk in the park and, despite our best efforts, it may not always 
yield definitive meanings. Moreover, originalism seemingly ca-
ters to the beliefs of dead, white males. and appears to be un-
democratic. What Rakove fails to grasp, however, is that much 
of his considerable intellectual firepower is misdirected; origi-
nalism is not the culprit. As a mode of interpretation, it cannot 
be charged with creating many of the problems Rakove catalogs. 
In reality, Rakove's problems lie with the Constitution and the 
very concept of law. Whether he knows it or not, Rakove does 
not think much of our Constitution. 
After considering Rakove's objections, this Review outlines 
an immodest claim about originalism: the use of ordinary, origi-
nal meanings is a fundamental background rule of construction 
(the "Default Rule"). Absent a statement or an indication to the 
contrary, we use ordinary, original meanings to construe virtu-
ally all communications. Thus, even though the Constitution 
does not contain a rule of construction, it nevertheless relies on 
the Default Rule. Likewise, statutes rely on the Default Rule 
unless they provide otherwise. 
Apart from the Default Rule's explanatory power, only 
originalism makes sense of the lawmaking process where law-
makers constrain posterity by carefully selecting words that have 
a finite set of meanings. Moroever, absent originalism we must 
question why we would bother to recognize an institution as a 
lawmaker and its words as law if we simultaneously reserve the 
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right to construe the law's words without regard to their original 
meanings. Put simply, without originalism we have to believe 
that lawmakers codify words but not meaning and we have to 
suppose that we sensibly can recognize some set of words as law, 
but supply our own meaning. These propositions are absurd and 
that is why we all are (or should be) originalists. 
I. RAKOVE ON ORIGINALISM 
We ought to judge Rakove's book by whether he realizes 
his two objectives. Rakove amply fulfills his first objective of 
exploring "how Americans created a national polity during the 
Revolutionary era." (p. xiii) The middle nine chapters of the 
eleven chapter book consider issues central to the Constitution's 
drafting and ratification: the events leading up to the Philadel-
phia convention, the debates in the conventions, and several 
critical subjects such as federalism, republican government, 
separation of powers, and individual rights. Rakove is an excel-
lent raconteur and one suspects that he received the Pulitzer 
Prize in history for these chapters. Though Rakove reaches no 
definitive conclusions about the Constitution's original mean-
ings, he does provide a wonderful account of the Constitution's 
framing and ratification. The book is an ideal starting point for 
originalists because it provides a needed historical context and 
highlights important historical sources. 
Rakove also considers whether originalism is the proper 
means of construing the Constitution. (p. xiii) He says no. Es-
tablishing his bona fides as someone who regards originalism as 
rather objectionable and even silly, he begins with very revealing 
objections. Tucked away in a footnote is his claim that origi-
nalism is "in some fundamental sense anti-democratic" because 
it subordinates the judgment of "present generations to the wis-
dom of their distant (political) ancestors." (p. xv, n.*) Along 
similar lines, Rakove insists that originalism must be wrong be-
cause the founding generation "would not have denied them-
selves the benefit of testing their original ideas and hopes against 
the intervening experience that we have accrued since 1789." (p. 
xv) Further, while originalism supposedly rests on the dubious 
"belief -or legal fiction- that most clauses of the Constitution 
possessed a clear meaning at their inception," (p. 340) the "real 
problems of reconstructing coherent intentions and understand-
ings from the evidence of history raise serious questions about 
the capacity of originalist forays to yield the definitive conclu-
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sions that the advocates of this theory claim to find." (p. xv, n.*) 
His only compliment is entirely back-handed. He admires origi-
nalism only when it supports the outcomes he favors. (p. xv, n. *) 
Indeed, this occasional ability to generate desired results, "may 
be as good a clue to the appeal of originalism as any other." (p. 
xv, n. *) Oddly enough, Rakove somehow believes such com-
ments betray his "ambivalen[ ce ]" towards originalism. (p. xv, 
n.*) One wonders what Rakove says about theories he openly 
disdains. 
Rakove properly highlights the limitations of history (and 
thus originalism). Historians "may think they are writing objec-
tive accounts of definable phenomena. But in practice ... there 
can be no single story of any event. ... [T]he composition of any 
narrative history requires decisions as to perspective and dra-
matic structure that differ little from the imaginative contriv-
ances of the novelist." (p. 6) Moreover, the "framing of the 
Constitution in 1787 and its ratification by the states involved 
processes of collective decision-making whose outcomes neces-
sarily reflected a bewildering array of intentions and expecta-
tions, hopes and fears, genuine compromises and agreements to 
disagree." (p. 6) Because of these difficulties, the belief that the 
Constitution had some "fixed and well-known meaning" must 
"dissolve[] into a mirage." (p. 6 ) Reading all this, one wonders 
whether the Pulitzer Prize for Literature would have been more 
appropriate! 
Notwithstanding this hand-wringing, Rakove redeems his 
craft (if not originalism). "[W]hat is most remarkable" is "not 
how little we understand but how much." (pp. 6-7) We might 
reach inconclusive conclusions on occasion or wish that we had 
more materials, but "the origins of the Constitution are not 
'buried in silence or veiled in fable."' (p. 7) Thus, Rakove 
brushes aside concerns of history, language, and collective action 
and draws numerous conclusions about the motivations and ac-
tions of the framers, ratifiers, and anti-federalists. Yet he never 
retracts his sharp methodological criticisms of originalism. 
Despite his dim view of originalism, Rakove classifies its 
various strains. He defines "original meaning" jurisprudence as 
an attempt to recover the meaning of words used in the Consti-
tution at the time of ratification. (p. 7) "Original intent" meth-
odology searches for the intentions of those who acted with 
"purpose and forethought"- the Philadelphia framers. (p. 8) 
"Original understanding" can be used to "cover the impressions 
and interpretations of the Constitution formed by its original 
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readers" in the ratification phase. (p. 8) Rakove admits these 
distinctions might "seem labored or overly precise." (p. 8) In-
deed, it is hard to see why "intent" applies to the drafters, but 
"understanding" concerns the ratifiers and the general public. 
Drafters clearly had "understandings" regarding various provi-
sions; otherwise, why go to the trouble of using certain words 
rather than others? Likewise, ratifiers undoubtedly "intended" 
to have particular provisions interpreted in one manner rather 
than another. Finally, it is unclear how Rakove distinguishes 
"original meaning" from "original understanding." A more use-
ful classification distinguishes textualism (what matters is the 
original meaning of the text) from intentionalism (what matters 
is what the drafters and/or the ratifiers said about the text).4 
Nonetheless, these distinctions matter to Rakove because 
he contends that originalism's most persuasive claim to legiti-
macy rests on the Constitution's particular ratification process. 
Originalism 
insists that original meaning should prevail ... because the 
authority of the Constitution as supreme law rests on its rati-
fication by the special, popularly elected conventions of 1787-
88. The Constitution derives its supremacy ... from a direct 
expression of popular sovereignty, superior in authority to all 
subsequent legal acts resting only on the weaker foundations 
of representation. (p. 9) 
In other words, the intentions of the framers and post-
ratification interpretations do not matter as the "understanding 
of the ratifiers is the preeminent and arguably sole source for re-
constructing original meaning." (p. 9) 
In laying down originalist rules of the road, Rakove seems 
to relish his privileged role in a quest that he ultimately rejects as 
a fool's errand. While "historians have little stake in ascertain-
ing the original meaning of a clause for its own sake, or in at-
tempting to freeze or distill its true, unadulterated meaning at 
some pristine moment of constitutional understanding," (p. 9) 
they can be expected to "guard their professional terrain jeal-
ously" against those who make suspect or bogus historical claims 
"with dogmatic certitude." (p. 10) Historians can provide origi-
nalism a methodological rigor that it currently sorely lacks. (p. 
11) 
4. See Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541,557 (1994). 
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In his final chapter, Rakove focuses on the debates in Con-
gress and post-ratification writings to discern the founding gen-
eration's view of original intent. Rakove concludes that origi-
nalism was not "legitimate" until the winter of 1796, when the 
House debated the Jay Treaty and James Madison explicitly en-
dorsed attempts to find meaning in the Constitution through re-
sort to the debates in the state conventions. Given Rakove's 
conclusion that what matters is the Constitution as understood 
by the ratifiers, (p. 9) one wonders why Rakove does not discern 
the meaning of the Constitution prior to its ratification with re-
spect t~ the fundamental question of how it should be inter-
preted.' 
In the end, although Rakove dismisses originalism, he at-
tempts to improve originalist analysis. If originalists persist in 
their folly, i.e., utilizing an anti-democratic theory that seeks 
definite meanings when there are none and that does not permit 
revisions to the Constitution in light of our nation's experience, 
historians can maintain a watchful eye to ensure that originalists 
do not fabricate a biased and flawed "law office history." (p. 11) 
(quoting Leonard Levy) Put another way, originalists not only 
subscribe to a highly dubious theory, they often are rather in-
adequate practioners of it. 
II. CRITIQUING RAKOVE'S ORIGINALISM 
Originalism withstands Rakove's slings and arrows. Some 
criticisms are true, but irrelevant. Others miss their mark en-
tirely and instead hit the very concept of law. At times, Rakove 
misunderstands originalism; at other times, he misdescribes it. A 
wag might charge that Rakove flays originalism by using a 
flawed "history department law." 
Consider Rakove's many methodological attacks. Recon-
structing the historical meanings of words that were used over 
200 years ago is daunting. It is hard enough to fathom statutes 
passed last year. Perhaps we ought to repudiate any methodol-
ogy that forces us to sift through musty documents only to reach 
dubious conclusions. But Rakove has hoisted himself with his 
5. Rakove does relate some episodes when individuals discussed the proposed 
Constitution and intimated that pre-ratification discussions might have an effect on fu· 
ture interpretations. (pp. 342-47) Notwithstanding his admonition to uncover "original 
meanings.'' he does not attempt to uncover the original meaning of the Constitution's 
words as they relate to interpretation. His efforts largely focus on what people said post-
ratification. 
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own historian's petard. If he may draw many fascinating conclu-
sions about what the founding fathers desired or detested, origi-
nalism's quest for the original meaning of a word or phrase can-
not be dismissed so breezily. After all, Rakove's musings about 
the Revolutionary Era are based solely on his reconstruction of 
the meanings of ancient words. Given the problems he identi-
fies, perhaps Rakove could discuss dates and names, but much 
less could be said about motives, intentions, personalities- the 
stuff which makes history come alive. Yet Rakove somehow be-
lieves that he can salvage history while savaging originalism. He 
cannot have it both ways. With respect to making sense of an-
cient words, history and originalism either sink or swim together. 
Rakove might regard history as fundamentally different be-
cause only originalism supposedly rests on the belief that "most 
clauses of the Constitution possessed a clear meaning at their in-
ception." (p. 340) This is a straw man. Originalism simply does 
not rest on a theory of definite meanings; it only requires an 
ability to determine which of several possible meanings better 
reflects the most natural reading of the word or phrase when the 
text was ratified. Not surprisingly, Judge Bork has admonished 
that we cannot expect perfection; rather we should strive to do 
"the best we can do," which, as he puts it, must be regarded as 
good enough.6 Along similar lines, Justice Antonin Scalia has 
remarked that to do a "perfect" job on the meaning of "Execu-
tive Power" one would have to spend "thirty years and 7,000 
pages."7 If we cannot draw relative conclusions, let alone make 
definitive interpretations, originalism may have nothing to con-
tribute to a given dispute. But such a result does not mean that 
originalism is wrong or useless generally, any more than it would 
make history pointless generally; it just means that not every-
thing will be as easy as we would like it to be and recourse to 
some other decision making process will be necessary.8 
6. Bork, Tempting of America at 163 (cited in note 3). Rakove takes a gratuitous 
swipe at Judge Bork for being an originalist who never has bothered to roll up his sleeves 
and dirty his hands. But original ism's validity and Judge Bork's arguments do not rest on 
whether Judge Bork or anyone else has labored over the original meaning of the Repub-
lican Guarantee Clause or some such provision. One does not need to do originalism to 
appreciate its claim of legitimacy. 
7. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849,852 (1989). 
8. Originalism should not be rejected merely because it sometimes will not assist 
us choose amongst many possible meanings. Any theory of interpretation must be open 
to the possibility that it will fail to yield a superior interpretation from time to time. In-
deed, because we sometimes encounter legal questions that we cannot answer with any 
degree of certainty, we ought to be highly suspicious of any theory that insists that it pro-
vides all the answers. 
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Yet rare is the case when all is in equipoise or when abso-
lutely no meaning comes to the fore. In fact, in the universe of 
questions that could arise about the Constitution, most are re-
solvable by resorting to original meanings.9 Because scholars fo-
cus on the more difficult (and hence more interesting) questions, 
this tends to be obscured. Surely no one doubts that there was 
some nearly universal understanding about the import of the 
presidential age re9ouirement. Similarly, there can be only one 
president at a time. These examples may seem trivial, but they 
illustrate some of the many questions that originalism helps re-
solve conclusively. 
Rakove's critique of originalism's supposed reliance on 
collective intentions makes a valid point, but presses it entirely 
too far. When a group passes a law all that can be said defini-
tively is that they agreed to a particular set of words in a specific 
order. As Rakove claims, perhaps all we know with absolute 
certainty about the Constitution is that the ratifying conventions 
preferred it to the Articles of Confederation. (p. 11) But the 
more sophisticated originalist does not believe it necessary to 
draw authoritative conclusions about collective intentions. We 
need not believe that every framer and ratifier consciously 
thought about a particular question and that they all came to the 
same conclusion. We only need suppose that the words chosen 
more likely convey one meaning rather than others and that 
groups of people can communicate meaningfully with others. 
This is something we do everyday when we interpret various 
communications. Indeed, we do not throw up our hands when 
considering a group's communication; rather we attempt to 
make sense of it using ordinary, original meanings. 
As Rakove correctly points out, the intentions of the fram-
ers, simpliciter, are irrelevant in terms of understanding the law. 
The first inquiry must be what counts as law. If we say that only 
a particular set of words is part of the law, we necessarily ex-
clude other sets of words. We also except from the ambit of law 
what people who wrote the law think that they wrote when there 
is no statutory basis for these understandings. Intentions with-
out a basis in the text do not matter because we have made an 
antecedent decision that what counts as law is the text! 1 When 
9. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399,414 (1985). 
10. See Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L.J. at 555-56 (cited in note 4). 
11. The concept of text as law is not the only possible recognition theory. However, 
it is arguably the best as it enables interpreters to identify "law" and distinguish it from 
other communications. In our federal system, the mechanisms of bicameralism and pres-
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the text is law, the desires, fears, and floor statements of the leg-
islators are not. 12 
If all this is true, why do originalists extensively quote the 
founding fathers? An originalist who draws conclusions from 
such statements is not making claims about what all the framers 
or ratifiers thought. Rather, she seeks to make sense of the text 
by surveying how its words were used in common parlance. In-
deed, the framers' or ratifiers' comments about a particular 
phrase or provision are often a fairly good reflection of what that 
phrase or provision commonly was understood to mean. Like-
wise, other writings and contemporaneous dictionaries furnish 
clues as to meanings. But remember: what was said contempo-
raneously matters only insofar as it sheds light on what the text 
might mean. A text has everyday meanings that exist apart from 
the sometimes unfounded expectations of its authors. 13 The cri-
tique of collective intentions simply does not doom the project of 
making the best sense of language drafted and ratified by 
groups. 
Because of the real problems of history and language, per-
haps originalism's proponents make too much of its ability to 
constrain judges. It cannot bind like the laws of physics. Be-
cause words lack inherent meanings, usage defines them. 14 (p. 8) 
entation help us differentiate congressional laws from other legislative communications. 
Without such an ability to distinguish some forms of communication from others, we 
could not separate those that we ought to treat as law from those sets of words that are 
not law. 
Someone like Professor Raoul Berger would disagree rather forcefully with the 
claim that intentions are not part of the law. '"The intention of the lawmaker is the law,' 
rising even above the text." Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design 15-16 (U. 
of Oklahoma Press, 1987) (quoting Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903)). In 
practice, intentionalism and textualism will often converge, given that legislators gener-
ally accurately discuss their legislative handiwork. However, there are instances where 
the legislators have not paid sufficient attention to the text or where they are merely 
playing games with future interpreters. 
12. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 547 
(1983) (contending that it makes no sense to search for a collective intent or design in 
law). See also In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1341-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (text trumps legisla-
tive history). 
13. For instance, certain framers and ratifiers may have thought that they delegated 
to Congress the power to constitute state courts as federal courts, thereby bypassing 
presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, but the text itself belies this interpreta-
tion. See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957, 2031 
(1993) (discussing those who thought that state judges could be legislatively appointed as 
federal judges as under Articles of Confederation); see generally, Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 
217, 227 n.3 (collecting cites that discusses instances in which intent varies from mean-
ing). 
14. In a seeming concession to originalists, Rakove asserts that language cannot be 
538 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol.15:529 
Given varied uses, words tend to have many meanings which 
vary with context and often change over time. The resulting 
play-in-the-joints enables judges to succumb to their own biases. 
More importantly, originalism will never constrain judges 
(or any other interpreter) because no theory can accomplish this 
hopeless task. A judge dedicated to a particular theory in the 
abstract may betray it in specific cases. Even a judge committed 
to deciding cases in line with her personal preferences may occa-
sionally conclude that the text constrains her. Thus, Rakove's 
lament that the Supreme Court's originalism "offers little reason 
to think" that it will render faithful and accurate originalist in-
terpretations is not damning at all. (p. 11) Like every other the-
ory, originalism has no answers for bad faith, bias, and other 
human frailties." 
Originalism overcomes Rakove's non-methodological at-
tacks as well. Some of his complaints reflect a surprising lack of 
sophistication about the law-here I guard the lawyer's turf. 
Consider his criticism that originalism is anti-democratic because 
it supposedly insists that the past should control the present. 
Originalism is not the culprit-Rakove's beef is with the Consti-
tution. It is undemocratic. As widely understood (and cele-
brated), the Constitution establishes a framework that cannot be 
altered by mere majority vote in the legislature, still less by a 
public opinion poll. Indeed, our Constitution serves no more 
important function than the creation of certain rules which are 
meant to prevent future simple legislative majorities from taking 
certain actions. Without this feature, i.e., the abilit¥ to constrain 
future majorities, we do not have our Constitution.1 
As alluded to above, Rakove has confused the Constitution 
with a particular interpretive method. When Rakove charges 
that originalism would "convert the Constitution into a brittle 
shell incapable of adaptation to all the changes that distinguish 
the present from the past," (p.xiii) he barks up the wrong tree. 
Originalism, by itself, has nothing to say about how constitutions 
infinitely malleable. (p. 368) He is wrong here; he was right earlier. Because usage de-
fines, language is infinitely malleable. Words or phrases lack an absolute "true" defini-
tion. All definitions can be temporary ones as usage may drag a definition far afield. 
15. See Scalia, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 863-64 (cited in note 7). 
16. Rakove sometimes appreciates antidemocratic constitutions. He queries "why 
morally sustainable claims of equality should be held captive to the extraordinary obsta-
cles of Article V or subject to the partial and incomplete understandings of 1789 or 
1868." (p. 368) When we have the judicial creation of rights on the basis of nothing 
more than "morally sustainable claims," we have a profoundly undemocratic process 
whereby judges strike down the actions of elected officials. 
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(or laws generally) ought to be altered. It favors neither the sen-
sibilities of dead white males nor the Zeitgeist of the moment. 
Nor is it either pro- or anti-democratic. Originalism is merely a 
theory of interpretation. 
Indeed, originalism could permit all sorts of modifications, if 
the law being interpreted permitted such modifications. Thus, if 
the Constitution's original meaning sanctioned judicial emenda-
tion and lawmaking, then a faithful originalist would find such 
practices proper. Similarly, originalism could privilege the sen-
sibilities of mostly dead brown, black, yellow, and white males as 
applied to the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. Likewise, if a 
constitution provided that, "the majority shall make any and all 
laws that it wishes," originalism, as applied to that constitution, 
would be profoundly hyper-democratic. Indeed, many are en-
amored by the notion that our Constitution contains imprecise 
language precisely because the founding generation wished to 
bequeath us a "living" Constitution. This is an originalist claim, 
i.e., a contention that the Constitution's original meaning per-
mits each generation to construe it as that generation sees fit. 
All these examples demonstrate that if one wishes to criticize an 
interpretive mode, one must distinguish the methodology from 
any particular text to which it could be applied. 17 Originalism 
cannot be blamed because the Constitution is undemocratic and 
seems like a brittle shell that reflects the outdated world views of 
propertied, white males.18 
Rakove's primary problem is that he approaches the law as 
a historian. Although Rakove appears to understand that what 
matters is the original meaning of legal text, his historian's bent 
predominates. Rakove recounts events in the time-honored tra-
dition of the historian less concerned about the meaning of legal 
text and more concerned with ideas.19 In fact, Rakove stead-
fastly refrains from examining the original meanings of any con-
17. As Professor Gary Lawson points out, our decision to accept the legitimacy of a 
law may depend upon how we construe it. But we ought not misconstrue something in 
order to find it legitimate. Better to construe the law properly and then accept or reject 
it. See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes ... and Constitutions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1823, 1831-
32 (1997). 
18. Twenty seven amendments suggest that the shell is not so brittle. 
19. His historian's training perhaps led him to some rather severe misunderstand-
ings of originalism. For instance, originalism is not "about the relation between ... two 
constitutions," one the historical constitution, as originally understood, and the other the 
"working constitution comprising the body of precedents, habits, understandings, and 
attitudes that shape how the federal system operates at any historical moment." (p. 339-
40) The theory of many constitutions, each one reflecting a period's convenient con-
struction, is the very antithesis of originalism as applied to our Constitution. 
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stitutional provision, notwithstanding his book's title. Knowing 
that so many complex and mutually conflicting ideas lie behind 
the Constitution and that text often results from grudging com-
promise, Rakove concludes that originalism is fraught with diffi-
culties. If he truly understood that only text and meanings are 
law, however, he would have construed the Constitution's text as 
he construed other ancient texts- using ordinary, original 
• 20 
meamngs. 
Of course, merely criticizing Rakove will not yield converts 
for originalism. Originalists must establish why the pursuit of 
original meanings is the proper means of interpreting the law. 
Standing on the shoulders of others, I briefly sketch some argu-
ments below. 
III. A DEFAULT THEORY OF INTERPRETATION 
How should we interpret the Constitution? Ordinarily, an 
originalist begins any inquiry with text. The Constitution, how-
ever, does not address how interpreters should go about divining 
its meaning; it lacks a handy decoder ring. Perhaps recognizing 
this, Rakove searches for answers by examining how individuals 
construed the Constitution in post-ratification political disputes. 
He also might believe that the Constitution's failure to designate 
an interpretive mode reflects a lack of consensus that forces us 
to look elsewhere. In other words, precisely because the Consti-
tution does not prescribe an interpretive theory, we must supply 
and justify our own. 
But it is far more likely that the failure to specify an inter-
pretive mode suggests implicit agreement. Without at least a 
general consensus as to how the Constitution would be con-
strued post-ratification, the founding generation would have 
drafted and ratified text but not any means of ferreting out 
meanings. Text, divorced from meanings, would be mere gib-
berish. Surely it is much more probable that when they drafted 
and ratified the Constitution, there was some commonly under-
stood means of interpreting it. There might not have been una-
20. I admit the possibility that my statements about Rakove's book could be well 
off the mark. If Rakove's critique of originalism is sound, it is entirely possible that I 
have misapprehended his book's original meaning. After all Rakove's book was written 
at least over two years ago, probably underwent a collective editing process, and is un-
doubtedly susceptible of a broad range of interpretations, depending on the bias of the 
reader. 
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nimity on what particular provisions meant, but there must have 
been some unspoken interpretational consensus. 
Indeed, some rules are so self-evident that they need not be 
expressed. For instance, I need not designate a particular mode 
of interpretation for the benefit of readers. Nor need I declare 
that English should be used to understand this Review. The 
reader automatically knows how to read it. Construction of the 
law is no different. 
The Constitution's very creation indicates that there was an 
implicit background rule of construction, the same rule that un-
derlies all laws and almost all forms of communication: construe 
words using their ordinary, original meanings (the "Default 
Rule"). Indeed, when we construe cookbooks, contracts, or 
conversations, we unconsciously apply the Default Rule. Like 
the air surrounding us, we reflexively rely upon it. On rare occa-
sions, say when we read poetry or fiction, we abandon the Rule. 
But these not~ble ex~epti~ns prov~ ~he Rule:. we ~~pically con-
strue words usmg thetr ordmary, ongmal meanmgs: 
The Default Rule is so universal that even Rakove adopts it 
and quite clearly expects that we adopt it in reading his book. 
As noted, when he draws conclusions about intents and events, 
Rakove is an originalist and a very good one at that. Most read-
ers would not tolerate a historian who interpreted ancient dia-
ries, letters, and documents as though they had been written yes-
terday. If we want to make sense of such documents, we must 
construe them using the proper meanings-their ordinary, origi-
nal meanings. Likewise, Rakove undoubtedly expects his read-
ers to adopt the Rule in making sense of his book. 
Assuredly, the framers and the ratifiers did not textualize 
explicitly their commitment to the Default Rule. This is hardly 
surprising-it is, after all, a background rule. It is understood 
even when left unsaid. In the same way that the Constitution 
implicitly compels the use of the English language and the con-
ventions of reading text left to right and top to bottom, the Con-
stitution also "constitutionalized" the Default Rule. Accord-
ingly, the Constitution's very existence as law reflects a 
21. Laws, recipes, and traffic directions can be seen as sets of instructions that ordi-
narily mean to convey a finite set of meanings. To use the instructions, we would use the 
Default Rule. If we choose not to use such meanings, we are no longer interpreting the 
recipe (or the law or the traffic directions), but instead making up our own. See Lawson, 
85 Geo. L.J. at 1831-32 (cited in note 17). See also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of 
the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231,1231 n.1 (1994). 
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commitment to original meanings. By saying nothing, it ern-
braces the Default Rule. 
Even if one rejected the notion of a Default Rule, origi-
nalisrn should be accepted for another reason: it makes the best 
(perhaps the only) sense of the lawmaking process in which 
lawmakers enact text and meanings. Laws exist to set rules for 
the future and thus future constructions are of paramount con-
cern to lawmakers. Indeed, a law exists to guide the conduct of 
relevant individuals until it is changed in a legitimate manner. 
No binding rule can be established, however, if an interpreter 
feels bound only to the text and not to particular meanings. If 
the law's meaning is allowed to change over time without an ac-
tual change in its language pursuant to recognized means, the 
lawmakers have not legislated anything. 
What is the alternate explanation of lawmaking? That 
lawmakers enact a law using a particular set of words rather than 
others, but with no expectation that future government actors 
will feel constrained to construe the law using the original 
meanings. Lawmakers do not gather in solemn proceedings and 
enact a statute using carefully chosen words, but then contem-
plate that the statute will float away untethered to any particular 
meanings, let alone language. For example, suppose that at the 
behest of domestic auto manufacturers, Congress passed a stat-
ute that prohibited car importation but permitted bicycle impor-
tation. Surely a Commerce Department official or a federal 
judge should not permit car importation merely because, 
through the passage of time, cars were now considered bicycles 
in common parlance or because an executive or a judge thought 
that changed circumstances warranted a relaxation of the car 
ban. If this sort of "interpretation" regularly occurred, it would 
make lawmaking an utter waste of tirne.22 
Indeed the framers and drafters certainly did not usher in 
our Constitution without some implicit understandings of what 
that document meant when enacted and how it ought to be in-
terpreted in the future. Consider a particularly odious provision. 
Congress could not ban the importation of slaves until1808.23 As 
Rakove observes, this ban was included at the behest of the 
delegates from southern States as a way of precluding future 
22. Thankfully, most legal issues are decided using the Default Rule. Members of 
Congress, knowing this, do not view their jobs as exercises in futility. 
23. U.S. Const., Art I,§ 9, cl. 1. 
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commerciallegislation.2~ (pp. 85-88) But these delegates would 
not have demanded this limitation had they believed that a fu-
ture interpreter legitimately could circumvent it by insisting that 
the meaning of "prohibit" or "year" had changed over time or 
that some powerful moral claim took precedence. These dele-
gates understood that the Constitution was supposed to be in-
terpreted in the future in the same manner as it was interpreted 
when it was enacted.25 
Similar claims could be made about other provisions. The 
founding generation certainly did not include an interstate com-
merce clause, but somehow intend to permit a future federal 
judge to declare that the federal government could not regulate 
commerce among the several states. Likewise, it is impossible to 
believe that the First Amendment protected political speech 
when enacted but that the passage of time, changed meanings, or 
changed circumstances permits a faithful interpreter to deny pro-
tection to a speech criticizing the government. 
Assuredly lawmakers can leave questions and issues open. 
For instance, lawmakers can use a word that lacks a commonly 
understood meaning. In such circumstances, Rakove is right to 
suggest that the law's meaning, in some sense, will be liquidated 
over time through practice and case law. (pp. 159-60 [quoting 
Federalist No. 38]) But it is unlikely that a constitution system-
atically will be left open-ended with no discernible meanings. 
Constitution-makers want to establish a system they (and their 
constituents) favor and thus they have ample reason to include 
the necessary language. Indeed, a constitution methodically de-
signed to establish nothing durable begs the question of why 
anyone bothered. Future generations do not need permission to 
do what is expedient. 
Originalism thus makes the best sense of the lawmaking en-
terprise. Legislating or constitution-making is not merely an ex-
ercise in stringing together various letters and symbols; rather it 
is about setting rules of conduct for the future using a particular 
set of words with a finite set of meanings. In other words, we 
should embrace originalism not because the framers or ratifiers 
might have wanted as much. We should embrace it because the 
24. U.S. Const., Art I, § 8, cl 3. 
25. Undoubtedly, the founding fathers knew that future interpreters might stray 
from the Default Rule. Like all lawmakers, they had the difficult task of hoping for the 
best from future interpreters, but preparing for the worst. 
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concept of lawmaking is incomprehensible outside of attempting 
to discern what the law meant when it was written.26 
Still, one may question why we ought to accept the Default 
Rule of construction if the Constitution does not expressly cod-
ify it. Even if the founding generation believed that they were 
codifying words and meanings, we need not feel fettered by un-
codified beliefs. We can adopt our own rules regarding interpre-
tation. Perhaps we can accept the Constitution, reject the sup-
posed implicit Default Rule, and avoid being chained to archaic 
and unhelpful meanings. 
While this strategy may seem plausible at first blush, it actu-
ally is incoherent. When we accept some text as law, we also 
commit to the law's original meanings. When we accept some 
text as law, we necessarily concede that the law binds us as a so-
ciety. The law curtails the freedom of some and/or cedes bene-
fits or privileges to others. Because we have agreed to be bound 
by the law, we acknowledge the legitimacy of such rules until 
some authorized lawmaker changes the law in a sanctioned 
manner. 
A law cannot bind us, however, if we merely submit to the 
lawmaker's words unconnected to any particular meanings. If 
the text's meaning can change over time, only our interpretive 
ingenuity and imagination constrain us. Indeed, to embrace the 
legitimacy of words as law without their original, ordinary 
meanings is to embrace nothing. If we adopt meanings that have 
no relationship to the original, ordinary meaning but that are in-
stead adopted for convenience, morality, or necessity, one must 
question why we recognized the underlying words as law in the 
first instance. Our decision to recognize text as law serves no 
purpose since we stand ready to supply any meaning we desire. 
Thus, a non-originalist must believe that she can accept some 
words as law, but not the notion that the lawmaker codified 
meanings; she can supply her own. This is akin to a litigant be-
lieving that he can submit to the jurisdiction of the court but re-
serve the right to interpret the court's judgment as he sees fit. 27 
26. This argument about law is very similar to Steven Smith's indictment against 
some "mindless" theories of interpretation. He claims that certain theories of lawmaking 
do not pay sufficient attention to the lawmaker. Without some concept of lawmaker, 
however, we have .. law without mind" which makes the meaning of law the product of 
historical accident. See Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 104 
(1989). Likewise, when we examine law from a non-originalist perspective, we exalt the 
interpreter and subordinate the lawmaker because the non-originalist must believe that 
the lawmaker only enacts text and not meanings. 
27. A non-originalist judge might believe that Article III authorizes her not only to 
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Until now, I have tried to argue that originalism is constitu-
tionally compelled because it is an implicit Default Rule, be-
cause the lawmakers enact laws with certain meanings to bind 
future actors, and because our decision to accept some law-
maker's text as law makes no sense without originalism. Sup-
pose for a moment, however, that the Constitution explicitly 
provided that original meanings were not to be used in its future 
construction. If the Constitution provided that "no provision 
contained herein need be interpreted by reference to original 
meaning," would such a provision sever the supposedly unsever-
able connection between original meaning and legal text? Not at 
all! To the contrary, we would construe this rule of construction 
using the Default Rule, and then proceed to construe the rest of 
the document applying the original meaning of the rule of con-
struction provision (and accordingly interpret the rest of the 
document any old way we like). The Default Rule remains op-
erative until we construe text as setting a new rule of construc-
tion.28 
Examples will prove useful in understanding these proposi-
tions. Suppose we stumbled upon a hitherto undiscovered con-
stitutional article that prohibited the federal government from 
"rakoving" the people. If we concoct our own meaning for this 
unfamiliar word, we render the prior act of lawmaking mean-
ingless and substitute our judgments for the lawmakers. The 
lawmakers included the provision to protect the people from 
only certain federal actions. Likewise, when we attach our own 
meanings, we call into question our prior determination to rec-
ognize some finite set of words as the law. Why bother ac-
knowledging some words as the law, if we feel free to declare 
that the law will mean whatever we would have it mean notwith-
standing the meaning(s) attached by the legislators? To be sure, 
given the obscurity of the term, we might not be able to recon-
struct any original meaning for this provision. Nevertheless, at 
least we would be engaging in the proper inquiry.29 
interpret the Constitution, laws, and treaties, but to amend them as well. As noted ear-
lier, if Article III contained such authority as a matter of original meanings, then a judge 
who amended while ""interpreting'" would be well within her rights. But most judges who 
amend profess to be interpreting only. More importantly, I do not believe that such 
views of the judicial role are sound interpretations of Article III as an original matter. 
28. If we found mere non-textual, intentionalist evidence that the framers and rati-
fiers did not want us to apply originalism, an originalist committed to the text as law 
would still embrace originalism. An originalist who believes that the text is law would 
not feel bound to honor such statements because such statements have no textual basis. 
29. Would not we abandon originalism as being silly if we systematically could not 
construe the Constitution's words? Not at all. We should not reject originalism merely 
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Reflect upon another example. If Congress drafted our 
laws in German, we naturally would expect that judges would 
employ German in order to make sense of these statutes. Once 
a judge (or any interpreter) understood the law to be written in 
German, it would make a mockery of that law if the judge con-
strued it as though it was in English or Sanskrit. Likewise, once 
a court knows that it is dealing with a 200-year-old document, it 
ought to adopt the language of 200 years ago to construe that 
document. To interpret the Constitution using modern English 
or using idiosyncratic definitions is to use the wrong language. 
* * * * 
Rakove misapprehends originalism's attraction. Origi-
nalism is somewhat persuasive to Rakove because originalism 
supposedly rests on the notion that the sovereign people 
adopted the Constitution. (p. 9) But the Constitution should be 
construed using the Default Rule not merely because it is an ex-
pression of popular sovereignty. If that were the originalism's 
special claim, it would have no claim to legitimacy in construing 
laws lacking a popular sovereignty foundation. Originalism's 
appeal actually stems from its comforting familiarity-it is a 
method we constantly employ everyday to construe all sorts of 
communications. If we are to depart from the Default Rule, 
surely there must be some evidence that the communication in 
question demands such unusual measures. Originalism also 
makes sense of the lawmaking process and our decision to accept 
text with meanings as the law. Ultimately, only originalism re-
flects our understanding that law consists of words and mean-
ings. When we reject originalism, we repudiate that under-
standing and embrace the existence of law without meaning. 
because it cannot make sense of gibberish. We would be better off amending the law 
itself. 
